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DIVORCE REFORM IN CALIFORNIA:
THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON
THE FAMILY AND BEYOND
Philip L. Hammer*t
On May 11, 1966, Edmund G. Brown, then Governor of California, established the Governor's Commission on the Family.' The
Commission was a bipartisan group composed of members of the
legal, medical and social welfare professions, the legislature and the
clergy. The Governor, recognizing that "the time has come to
acknowledge that our present social and legal procedures for dealing with divorce are no longer adequate,"' directed the Commission
to undertake a "concerted assault on the high incidence of divorce
'
in our society and its often tragic consequences.
On December 15, 1966, the Commission submitted its final report and recommendation to the Governor. The recommendations
are summarized as follows:
[T]he Commission recommends, in essence, the creation of a statewide Family Court system as part of the Superior Court, with jurisdiction over all matters relating to the family. The Family Court is
to be equipped with a qualified professional staff to provide counseling
and evaluative services. We recommend that the existing fault grounds
of divorce and the concept of technical fault as a determinant in the
division of community property, support and alimony be eliminated,
and that marital dissolution be permitted only upon a finding that the
marriage has irreparably failed, after penetrating scrutiny and after
the parties have been given by the judicial process every resource in
aid of conciliation. We recommend that a neutral petition be substituted for the present adversary pleading by complaint and answer. In
short, it has been our goal to establish procedures for the handling of
marital breakdown which will permit the Family Court to make a full
and proper inquiry into the real problems of the family-procedures
which will enable the Court to focus its resources upon the actual
* B.A. 1958, Stanford University; J.D. 1961, University of California, Berkeley;
Chairman, Family Law Section, Santa Clara County Bar; Member, California Bar.
t The author acknowledges the invaluable assistance of W. Richard Such, Member,
Class of 1969, Stanford University School of Law.
1 Appointed as Co-Chairmen of the Commission were Judge Pearce Young of the
Los Angeles Superior Court (then an Assemblyman) and San Francisco attorney
Richard C. Dinkespiel. The Executive Director was Professor Aidan R. Gough of the
University of Santa Clara School of Law.
2 Letter from Governor Edmund G. Brown to the Governor's Commission on
the Family, May 11, 1966.
S

Id.
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difficulties confronting the parties, and will at the same time safeguard
their rights and preserve the confidentiality of the information thus
4
acquired.

The Commission's recommendations are embodied in the proposed Family Court Act.' The Act is described in detail elsewhere.'
The present article will, therefore, be confined to a discussion of the
need for reform of the present divorce system and to a criticism of
particular provisions of the Family Court Act.
THE NEED FOR DIVORCE REFORM

A.

The "Soaring Rate of Divorce"

Part of the initiative for what may be called "divorce reform"
comes from the general belief in "the growing divorce rate" or in
"the declining stature of the married state."" Some perspective on
the "soaring rate of divorce" may be gained from the following
table:
FINAL DIVORCES, NUMBER, RATE PER 1000
POPULATION, 1922-1966-CALIFORNIA9

Year

Average Number

Average Rate

1922-1925
1926-1930
1931-1935
1936-1940
1941-1945
1946-1950
1951-1955
1956-1960
1961-1965
1966

10,122
14,267
14,510
20,234
27,361
38,763
35,995
40,229
51,935
62,648

2.3
2.6
2.4
3.1
3.2
3.9
3.0
2.7
2.9
3.3

4 REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON THE FAMILY 1-2

(1966)

(herein-

after cited as REPORT).
5 A.B. 230 and S.B. 88, Calif. Legislature, Reg. Sess. (1968) (hereinafter
cited
as ACT). The Act was introduced in the California Legislature by Senator Donald
L.
Grunsky and Assemblyman Winfield Shoemaker. Action on the bill was delayed
to
enable a committee of the State Bar of California to consider the bill and
make its
recommendations. The recommendations of the committee are discussed injra.
6 Dinkelspiel & Gough, A Family Court Act for Contemporary
California-A
Summary of the Report of the Governor's Commission on the Family, 42
J. ST. B.
CAIFp. 363 (1967); Dinkelspiel & Gough, The Case for a Family Court, 1
FAM. L.Q.
70 (1967); REPORT.
7 Letter from Governor Edmund G. Brown to the Governor's Commission
on
the Family, May 11, 1966.
8 Letter from Governor Edmund G. Brown to the California
State Assembly,
March 4, 1964.
9 CALIF. DEP'T. PUB. HEALTH, BUREAU OF STATISTICS,

114 (1967).
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The table shows that, whereas the absolute number of divorces
has increased over the years, just as the California population has
increased, the number of final decrees of divorce for each 1000 residents of California (the divorce rate) has remained relatively constant, with fluctuations apparently due to war and depression. The
average rate for the years 1961-1965, 2.9, is equal to the average
rate for the years 1922-1960. The apparent increased rate for 1966
is presumably a result of the legislature's amendment of Civil Code
section 136 in 1965, allowing the entry of a final judgment of
divorce one year after the service of summons and complaint, as
opposed to one year after the entry of the interlocutory judgment."
The Vietnam war, social unrest, and inflation may also be factors
affecting the increase.
The fact that the divorce rate is not "soaring" does not, however, mean that the incidence of divorce is not a cause for concern.
In 1959, the divorce rate for the United States as a whole was 2.24,
as compared to 1.2 for Sweden, 0.83 for West Germany, 0.61 for
France and 0.51 for England and Wales in 1960.11 It is estimated
that one of every four marriages, and one of every five first mar12
riages, in the United States ends in divorce. The comparable estimate for California is higher, as a result of the lower marriage rate
and higher divorce rate. The lower marriage rate is due to the high
rate of migration to California (only 44.6% of the parties to actions
instituted in California in 1966 for divorce, annulment or separate
maintenance were married in California) 3 and to the frequency of
Nevada marriages (30.3% of the California-born parties to such
actions were married in Nevada)."4 The higher divorce rate in California is probably also due to migration and its vicissitudes.
Another disturbing statistic is that almost two-thirds of the divorces granted in reporting states, in 1964, were to couples with at
5
least one child under eighteen years of age. Sixty per cent of the
parties to actions instituted in California in 1966 for divorce, annulment or separate maintenance had one or more children under
eighteen. 6
10 Id. at 7.

11 Schmidt, The "Leniency" of the Scandinavian Divorce Laws, in 7
118 (F. Schmidt ed. 1963).
230 (1962).

SCANDI-

NAVIAN STUDIES IN LAW 107,
12 R. BLOOD, MARRIAGE

13 CALIF. DEP'T PUB. HEALTH,

BUREAU

OF STATISTICS, DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA

62 (1967).
14

Id. at 63.

15

U.S.

DEP'T OF HEALTH,

EDUCATION AND

UNITED STATES 2-10 (1964).
16 CALIF. DEP'T PUB. HEALTH,

46 (1967).

WELFARE, VITAL STATISTICS

BUREAU OF STATISTICS,
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Although the rate of divorce may not be appreciably greater
today relative to the rate throughout the last half century, there is
no question that the absolute number of divorces poses a grave
social problem with which the present divorce system is apparently
unable to cope. The question is what legal means are available to
solve that problem.
B.

The Amenability of the Social Problem of Divorce to Legal
Solutions

In 1965 the California Legislature established, under the
Bureau of Vital Statistics, a uniform, statewide system for the collection of information concerning every action for divorce, annulment or separate maintenance and the characteristics of the parties
to such actions.' 7 The Bureau's first report," for 1966, is of remarkably high quality and should be of great interest to social scientists
and attorneys alike. Among the findings included in the report are
the following:
1. In 44.9% of the cases, either the husband or the wife or both had
been previously married. 19
2. The earlier the marriage, the more likely a divorce, especially for
females, and especially for teenage females who marry non-teenage
males.

20

3. In the case of first marriages, the earlier the marriage, the sooner
the divorce, until age thirty, and, thereafter, the later the marriage,
the sooner the divorce. 21
4. Interracial and interfaith marriages last about two-thirds as long
as intraracial and intrafaith marriages. 22
5. The lower the occupational category of the husband the shorter the
time between marriage and separation. 23
6. In about 15% of the cases, by the best estimate, the wife had
conceived a child prior to the marriage. 24 The corresponding figure
for teen-age wives was about 25%.25

There is little, if anything, that the law can or should do to
prevent or discourage remarriages, early marriages, interracial or
17 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§

10360-71 (West Supp. 1967).

18 CALIF. DEP'T PUB. HEALTH, BUREAU OF STATISTICS, DIVORCE IN CALIFORNIA

(1967).

19 Id. at 18.
20 Id. at 127.
21 Id. at 25.
22 Id. at 29, 43.
23 Id. at 31.

24

Id. at 53.

25 Id. at

61.
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interfaith marriages, marriages of low-income men, or marriages of
pregnant women. A law could of course be passed forbidding second
marriages or raising the age of consent, for example, but if such a
law were not adopted by our sister states it would be virtually unenforceable and therefore undesirable. Moreover, practically any
restriction on the marriageability of members of a given class, even
if enforceable, would probably prevent at least as many happy as
unhappy marriages. The law can, on the other hand, do something
in the way of creating more auspicious conditions for marriages, for
example, by establishing programs of sex education. Also, legislation
directed at improving economic and social conditions would make
life in general, and married life in particular, more tolerable. But
the favorable results that can be expected from such remedial legislation are limited. A more comprehensive approach to the solution
of the social problem of divorce is needed. No matter how ill-starred
a marriage may be, the law must aim at saving it when it begins to
founder. Such is one of the aims of the Family Court Act.
C.

The Legal Problem of Divorce

In addition to a mechanism for the alleviation of the social
problem of divorce, the Act proposes a solution to the legal problem
of divorce-what England's Justice Scarman refers to as the law's
achievement of a "high productivity level of divorce by artificialities
which most of us deplore, and sometimes at a price of suffering inflicted upon the innocent which no humane society should tolerate." 2 6
The prevailing legal doctrine and procedures with respect to
divorce were subjected to devastating criticism in "The Report of
a Group appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury."2 7 The Group,
which was chaired by the Lord Bishop of Exeter and included the
Lord of Appeal and a Justice of the High Court of Justice, set forth
its objections as follows:
(a) [O]ne may say that the actions which count as matrimonial
offences ... are not as a rule the basic causes of marital failure: their
Consequently, the conrelation to the failure is more complex ....
centrations of judicial attention upon the offences defined by the law
invokes a false set of values, and invests with spurious. objectivity
to the variacts of which the real significance varies widely according
ous qualities of marital relationship that provided their setting .
26 Address by Justice Scarman, Family Law and Law Reform, at the University
of Bristol, Mar. 18, 1966.
27 THE REPORT OF A GROUP APPOINTED BY THE ARcHrsIHoP OF CANTERBURY.

PuTuiwq AsuNDER; A PIvoRcf: IAW JQR CONTEXPORARY SOCIETY (1966).
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(b) The accusatorial procedure that the present law entails is no less
superficial and remote from marital realities. . . . Sometimes a suitable
offence can be conjured up from the history of the marriage; sometimes, if those concerned are not too scrupulous, one will be contrived;
in either event a nonsense is made of the law....
(c) The necessity to use the processes of this system . . . can encourage spouses to commit offences on purpose, or to twist the conduct of their partners into the semblance of offences, or to act together
in collusion to get what they want. In such instances . . . the law in
effect admits 'divorce by consent'....
(d) [T]he logic of the matrimonial offence requires the court to
pronounce one of the parties 'guilty' and the other 'innocent'. ... [T]he
spouse found 'guilty' of the offence in question is thereby held generally responsible for the breakdown of the marriage; and that may
be far indeed from doing justice to the 'guilty' person ...
(e) [T]he existing grounds for divorce are mutually inconsistent.
If . . . the moral principle underlying the doctrine of the matrimonial
offence is right and necessary to be maintained, then divorce on the
ground of a spouse's insanity must surely be immoral; for insanity is
28
not an offence but an affliction.
Another fiction of the present divorce system is that courts

inquire into the facts surrounding uncontested divorces. As stated by
the authors of the Family Court Act:
[E]xtreme cruelty . . . is the ground upon which 96% of California's
divorces are sought and granted. 94% of these hearings are uncontested, and it is at once apparent that there can be no meaningful
purpose achieved by continuing to operate under a system which
29
lends itself to a form of sham inquiry.

The authors of the Act also indicate that "the need for the
parties to assume a formal adversary posture at the outset of the
judicial process" causes "conflict and rancor between the parties"
and thus "any efforts toward reconciliation are hindered at best and
rendered futile at worst." 30 Further objections to the adversary
system are raised below in the section on legal representation. 3 '
The Family Court Act would replace the "fictions, artificialities
and subventions" 32 of the matrimonial offense system with a "nofault" doctrine and a largely non-adversary proceeding for the dissolution of marriage.
Id. at 28-31.
29 REPORT at 30-31 (footnotes omitted).
80 Id. at 17-18.
31 See p. 49 infra.
32 Scarman, supra note 26, at 3.
28
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ACT

ProfessionalInterviewing and ConciliationCounseling

The proposed Act provides that a "proceeding concerning the
dissolution of marriage shall be commenced by the filing of a petition ... requesting the family court 33 to inquire into the continuance
of the marriage."4 Thereupon, the clerk of the family court "shall

fix a date for an initial interview or interviews at which the parties
and a member of the professional staff (hereafter called the counselor) will begin to explore together the desirability of continuing
the marriage." 35 The Act inconsistently provides that "[t]he attendance of each party at one of the interviews at least shall be a condition of continuing the proceeding ... 36 while also providing that
"[w]illful failure to appear as ordered . . . shall not defeat the
jurisdiction of the court to dissolve the marriage. '37 What is perhaps
meant is that the attendance of the party making the petition is a
condition of continuing the proceeding, but that the non-attendance
of the other party does not defeat the jurisdiction of the court.
After the interview or interviews and within 30 days of filing
proof of service of the petition, the, counselor will inform the judge
"whether the parties have decided to (1) become reconciled .. .;
(2) continue counseling for a period not to exceed 60 days from the
date of filing of proof of service of summons and petition with a
view to their possible reconciliation . . . ; or (3)

continue their

application for an inquiry into the marriage, with a view to its posThe language of these provisions presupsible dissolution .... ,,31

poses that both parties have met with the counselor and are able to
agree upon the future course of the proceedings. The Act gives no
guidance as to what course should be followed when one party has
not attended an interview or when one party desires counseling with
a view to reconciliation and the other party desires counseling with a
view to dissolution of the marriage. Neither does the Act outline
what steps will be taken if one of the parties desires no counseling.
33 The Act would create a division of the Superior Court, known as the family
court, with jurisdiction extending to all "matters that involve the legal relationships
between members of a family unit." ACT § 4100. The quoted language has been
correctly criticized by the Committee of the State Bar to Study the Report of the
Governor's Commission on the Family as overly broad in that it would unnecessarily
bring into the family court matters concerning, for example, simple partnership
dissolutions and partitions of land. Letter from Robert L. Brock, Chairman, to the
Board of Governors of the State Bar of California, Feb. 12, 1968 (copy on file at
offices of Santa Clara Lawyer) (hereinafter cited as Brock Letter).
34 ACT. § 4702.

35 Id.§ 4703(a).
30 Id.
37 Id.§ 4703(b).
;'8Id. § 4704.
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If the parties agree to pursue the second course and fail to become reconciled within the 60 day period, they may renew their
application, and, if they do, they shall then undertake the third
course. 9 Under the third course, counseling would be "for the purpose of working out a settlement of the circumstances attendant
upon the dissolution of the marriage including the problems of child
custody and visitation. 4 °
1. Mandatory Counseling. The committee appointed by the
Board of Governors of the State Bar to study the Report of the
Governor's Commission and the Family Court Act, read the Act to
provide for "mandatory interviewing and counseling. ' 41 The State
Bar Committee "unanimously and sharply opposed . . .this no-

tion." 42 Only attendance at the initial interview, however, is "mandatory" (i.e., may be ordered on pain of contempt of court), 43 and
the Governor's Commission distinguished between "reconciliation
counseling" and the "initial evaluations". 4 ' This distinction is
blurred by the Commission itself. In speaking of the "initial evaluation" the Commission states:
If [at the termination of the initial interview] the parties decide
that further counseling may be of benefit, we recommend that they
be empowered to continue it .... If the parties conclude that reconciliation is not feasible, they enter into further consultation. .... 45

The Commission's talk about "further" counseling leads to the
conclusion that the drafters of the Act intended that some counseling should take place at the initial (mandatory) interview. The
"dead end" into which the parties run if they do not desire counseling (that is, the impossibility of continuing the proceeding unless
one of the three courses specified by section 4704 is chosen) and the
imperative language of section 4705 ("they shall undertake counseling") implies that after the initial interview the parties might decide which sort of counseling to undertake, but not whether to
undertake it. If counseling is mandatory under the Act, then grave
questions arise with respect to the practical efficacy of such provi39

Id. § 4705.

40 Id. § 4704.

41 Brock Letter at 2.
42 Id.
43 ACT. § 4703(b).
44 REPORT at 83-84.
45 Id. at 20 (emphasis

added). But what is meant by "further" counseling? See

also Dinkelspiel & Gough, A Family Court Act for Contemporary California-A Summary of the Governor's Commission on the Family, 42 J. ST. B. CALF. 363, 370

(1967) where the members of the Commission state: "If the parties decide that
further counseling might be of benefit, -they could continue either with the professional staff of the court or with qualified individuals or agencies in the community."
(emphasis added).
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sions and to the invasion of the "privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship. '46 In any event, the Act should be amended to clarify
the stage at which counseling is to be undertaken and whether or not
it is mandatory or a condition of continuing the proceedings.
2. Practicalityof Mandatory Interviewing. So far as the practical difficulty is concerned, experience has shown that compulsory
conciliation counseling may be unworkable. 47 As the authors of the
Pennsylvania Divorce Code say:
New Jersey recently undertook an experiment in this area .... [T]he
Supreme Court of New Jersey . . .announced that in ten counties of
New Jersey, after September 1, [1957], any couple seeking divorce or
separation, must cooperate in an attempt to effect a reconciliation if
any children are involved. The plan was tested for three years and
found to be unsuccessful due to its compulsory features and in 1960-61,
to devise a substitute plan based on vola committee was appointed
48
untary counseling.

3. Right of Privacy. The "right of privacy" difficulty with
mandatory counseling has two aspects: first, the question of whether
the state has any business at all in subjecting particular marriages
to "a penetrating scrutiny"4 9 or inquiring "into the whole picture
of the marriage,"" and, second, whether the Act provides sufficient
protection for the confidential results of such scrutiny.
The first aspect is vividly spelled out by Professor Max Rheinstein, the Director of the University of Chicago Comparative Law
Research Center, in his article on the "therapeutic approach" to
the problem of marriage stability:
[I]t will, of course, be necessary for the family court's staff in every
case to discover the true cause of the marital discord. . . .The discovery of the true cause may not be too difficult in a good many
cases, but there are others where it cannot be discovered without
probing into the depth of the personalities of the parties concerned,
especially if a cure is sought to be achieved by means of depth psychology. The "true" cause of a couple's marital discord may be
of a delicate nature, especially when it is connected with sexual
46 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
47 Gower, Testimony before the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce,
1 MINUTES OF EVIDENCE 24 (1952): "[In every country where [compulsory recon-

cilation] has been tried I understand that it has proved a complete farce. . . .I have
spoken to French and German judges about this, and they have all agreed that it is
completely farcical." The problems of expense and recruitment are also practical
barriers. See Goddard, The Proposal for Divorce Upon Petition and Without Fault,
43 J. ST. B. CALIF. 90, 98 (1968).
48 GENERAL ASSEMBLY

OF

THE COMMONWEALTH

OF PENNSYLVANIA,

MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE CODES FOR PENNSYLVANIA 87 (1961).
49 REPORT at 23.

50 Id. at 29.

PROPOSED
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maladjustment. Shall a citizen who is trying to be freed from
a tie of marriage be compelled to submit to such a probing into
his mind as a necessary condition for his petition to be considered?
Shall such compulsion be exercised upon the other spouse? What, incidentally, shall be done if the other spouse refuses to submit to such a
diagnostic trial? The questions raise the far-reaching problem of what
constitutes the proper limits of governmental power as against individual freedom. Again, in the United States the tradition has been that
51
of keeping governmental influence at a minimum.

The "true cause" of the marital breakdown having been determined, the "therapeutic approach" then turns to an attempt to
eliminate that cause, entailing, in many cases, the reformation of
the party's character.
We concede to the state the right to attempt a personality transformation in the case of a convicted criminal. . . .Are we ready to concede
to the state the same grave power of transforming the personality
structure of a citizen simply because he has failed to make a success
out of a marriage with some other individual? Do we have enough
confidence in the present state of psychiatry to regard it as able to
achieve such a task? 52 If it is, we are confronted with the even more
profound problem of the image in which we wish the patient's personality to be reformed. . . . If psychiatry really can do what the
advocates of the therapeutic approach expect it to do, it holds such
frightful possibilities that one should hesitate to impose it as an
indispensable condition upon anyone who seeks to be freed from a
tie of marriage.5

To require a psychiatric type examination and counseling of
persons seeking dissolution of their marriage is a potentially significant interference by the state with the privacy and personal
liberties of the individual. It should be permitted only where there
is an overriding state interest. The most obvious state interests that
would be served by such counseling are the protection of a spouse
who does not desire the dissolution of the marriage, the protection
of minor children who may suffer from a broken home, the reduction of anti-social hostility and tension, and, in the eventuality that
the marriage should be dissolved, the working out of a rational and
consensual distribution of the property, provision for support of
the parties and children, and arrangement for the custody of the
children. These interests, when they obtain, fairly clearly outweigh
51 Rheinstein, The Law of Divorce and the Problem of Marriage Stability, 9
VANr.

L. REv. 633, 638 (1956).

52 Compare the Commission's faith in the "great advances in the knowledge of
human behavior," REPORT at 11, with Kimpton, The Social Sciences Today, in THE
STATE OF THE SocIAL ScIENcEs 350-51 (L.White ed. 1956): "[Paracelsus] stood on
the border between magic and science, with a foot in both. . . .Perhaps the social
sciences stand today somewhere near the position that Paracelsus occupied."
53 Rheinstein, supra note 51, at 638-39.
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the interest of the individual in being free from inquiry by the state
into the events of his private life.
But when both parties desire the dissolution of the marriage,
where there are no minor children, and where the parties can work
out for themselves a distribution of the property and provision for
support, then there is no state interest sufficient to justify such
inquiry and counseling. The reconciliation that might be brought
about in that situation is not, in other words, in the public interest,
or not so much in the public interest as to justify an invasion of
personal rights by the state. Although counseling might still have
the publicly beneficial effect of helping the parties to separate
amicably, it is just as likely to revive conflicts that they would
rather put behind them. When, therefore, the parties both assert
a desire to dissolve the marriage, when they have no minor children,
and when they have reached agreement in writing upon property
distribution and support, they should be allowed to waive the
initial interview and subsequent counseling.
Even where there is a sufficient state interest in compelling
counseling, a further problem of individual liberty arises under the
proposed Act. The Act provides that "[t]he counselor shall file a
written report with the judge ... at the conclusion of the counseling
period as provided in Section 4704," that "[t]he report . ..shall
include a statement of the circumstances of the parties ... and the

counselor's recommendations together with supporting facts as to
the continuance of the marriage," and that a "copy of the report
shall be given to the parties. .

. .""

Section 4704 of the Act pro-

vides also that "[a]ll communications made by either party to
any counselor under subparagraph (2) of this section shall be
absolutely privileged."
So far as the wording of the statute is concerned, ignoring for
a moment the Comment,55 section 4714 seems to require the counselor to present the judge with (all) facts that support his recommendation as to the continuance of the marriage. Section 4704, on
the other hand, prevents the counselor from revealing facts upon
which his recommendation would, in the ordinary case, necessarily
depend.
54 ACT § 4714.

55 REPORT at 85. "It is the intent of [section 47041 to broaden the scope of the
protection afforded to communications made in the course of reconciliation counseling,
and to ensure their immunity from disclosure even upon inquiry by the judge. For
this reason, the wording 'absolute privilege' was used. . . .The Commission emphasizes, however, that this privilege should apply only to communications made during

reconciliation counseling and not to information imparted during the initial evaluations
or subsequent investigations."
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Taking the Comment into consideration, it appears that it is
intended that the counselor should not recite facts learned during
the reconciliation process.5 6 In that case, the counselor must either
make his recommendation on the basis of such facts, while not
revealing them, or else make his recommendation in disregard of
such facts. The former alternative would effectively cut the judge
out of the decision-making process, and the latter would require
the counselor to perform a feat of mental gymnastics.
The solution to this dilemma would seem to be either to require
the counselor to prepare his report and present it to the judge and
parties upon the termination of the initial interview and investigation and before the reconciliation period or to eliminate the "absolute privilege" as to communications made during that period. The
difficulty with the latter solution, in addition to that spelled out in
the next paragraph, is that
[t]he possibility that the counselor might be required to divulge to
the court such personally sensitive disclosures as the reconciliation
process would necessarily involve, could only result in a lack of confidence on the parties' part, and57 a consequent unwillingness to utilize
conciliation counseling services.

A difficulty with the former solution, which attends the whole
notion of the counselor's report, is that a counselor may acquire

information, whether in the interview, investigation or reconciliation stage, which may be prejudicial, or simply embarrassing, to
one or both of the parties. It would be one thing if such information
were divulged by the parties, under oath, in open court, and subject
to the test of cross-examination, to the standard of section 352 of
the California Evidence Code, and to such restraint as the parties
may choose to exercise in the interest of each other's personal
feelings and self-respect. But it is quite another thing to admit
in evidence, without the opportunity for objection, the counselor's
second-hand version of whatever the parties have, for whatever
reason, chosen to reveal or to cook up in the informal atmosphere
of the initial interview or during reconciliation counseling. Why
should the judge be presented with the counselor's hearsay report
of one party's untested statement that the other party is sexually
maladjusted in a particular way, or, for that matter, with a similar
statement that the one party has behaved toward the other with
56

But it must be noted that such information as is imparted during the initial

interview is not privileged and it became apparent (see note 45 supra) that the Com-

mission intended that some reconciliation counseling would take place at the first
interview. And note the reference in the Report to "investigations"-does this mean
that information which the counselor gets on the side may be included in his report?
57 REPORT at 22.
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perfect charity (or with the counselor's purely conclusionary report
to that effect)? Why should the other party be exposed to the counselor's perhaps half-baked judgment that he is a sexual misfit?
It is no answer to say that the counselor's report does not
materially affect the parties' legal rights, for the judge must make
important determinations concerning, for example, the custody of
children, which the counselor's report could not help but affect.
Nor is it an answer to say that the parties may present evidence in
contradiction of the counselor's report,58 for the report, however
prejudicial and unreliable, will remain "in the case". (And how
does one prove that one really is sexually normal?)
There is a possible safeguard against the dangers inherent in
the counselor's report, and that is to allow the parties to object to
any part of the report on the same grounds as they might object
if the counselor were testifying in court. The practical difficulty,
however, is that the judge must read the counselor's report in order
to rule on what parts may be stricken. If this difficulty were overcome by obtaining a ruling from a judge not assigned to the case,
there would still be the further difficulty that, in practice, each
party would probably object, on grounds of hearsay, to any part
of the report based on the declarations of the other or a third party
which he considered detrimental to his side. Then, if the other party
wished to bring the subject of such declarations to the attention
of the judge, he would have to call himself or a third party to
testify. Without such testimony, the recommendation (opinion) of
the counselor would be without a proper basis. It should be further
noted that the right to object to the introduction of information
included in the counselor's report would be a hollow one so far as
an unrepresented spouse is concerned.
Now we are back to where we started, with the counselor's
report reduced to a skeleton and the bulk of the evidence before
the court having been produced in the ordinary way. The conclusion is apparent that the counselor's report should be done away
with altogether. It has, even if in a relatively innocuous way, all
the evils with which our law of evidence is designed to cope. The
evidence that the judge needs in order to decide the case can, after
all, be presented by the parties. The elimination of the counselor's
report would preserve, from the eyes of the judge and others, intimate facts of the marriage relation which the parties may reveal
to the counselor or may be revealed by the counselor's investigations
and which are, basically, none of the business of government. To
58

See AcT § 4716.
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that extent, the parties' personal rights would be preserved. It would
allow the parties to engage in honest, open-ended and, therefore,
potentially constructive discussions with the counselor, without the
threat of subsequent exposure, embarrassment or legal disadvantage.
Of course, one hope for the Family Court Act is that it would
save some marriages that the parties do not want to save, or think
cannot be saved. One function of the counselor would be to make
an expert recommendation as to which such marriages might be
saved. In making that recommendation, facts other than what the
parties might choose to present in court would be useful to the
counselor, but if the parties can suppress facts in court, they could
as easily do so in interviews with the counselor. They probably
would so do, because of a reasonable apprehension that, regardless
of the "absolute privilege," disclosures might adversely affect the
counselor's recommendation. There is, moreover, no compelling
reason why the counselor could not make a recommendation independent of any report to the judge or on the basis of the facts presented at the hearing.
There is an additional practical problem with the counselor's
report. One wonders how much of the counselor's time will be spent
in the preparation of reports. If the counselor does an adequate
job, then he will have very little time remaining for his important duty of counseling-the married reader should ask himself
how much labor would be involved in preparing a careful and
comprehensive description of his own marriage. If the counselor
prepares his report in a summary manner, then the report would
amount to an empty formality and justice would often be denied.
A more comprehensive and attractive solution to the problem
of the counselor's report, as well as to the problem of compulsory
counseling, is suggested by Rheinstein. He would, instead of "compelling everyone who seeks to formalize the breakup of his marriage
... as

a preliminary to submit to treatment aimed at changing his

personality,"5 9 shift the focus to the prevention of marital crises
by means of publicly supported education for family living. Further,

by means of "reconciliation proceedings . . . separated from the

divorce court, ' 60 he would provide conciliation counseling "in the
case of a marriage in which difficulties have appeared to arise, in
59 Rheinstein, supra note 51, at 666.

0oId. at 661. "Such a separation also will avoid the difficulty that reconciliation
proceedings either degenerate into that kind of meaningless formality which they are
likely to be where the divorce court's docket is overcrowded, or that the parties are
bullied into a 'reconciliation' which they do not really intend and which is unlikely
to last."
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which no separation has yet occurred and in which both parties are
'
willing to maintain their relationship." 61
In fairness, it must be said that what the drafters of the Family
Court Act probably intended was something close to what Rheinstein proposes, so far as the prevention of marital crises is concerned,62 but common sense tells us that parties will not ordinarily
approach the family court until their marital problems have become
extremely critical. They would be inclined to seek counseling at
an earlier stage if reconciliation proceedings were not so closely
associated with proceedings for the dissolution of the marriage.
Another problem concerns the confidential nature of the report.
Proposed section 4706 provides that "the records of the family
court shall be confidential and shall be available . . . to persons
who . . . have a legitimate educational or research interest in the

work of the family court." There can be very little question that
a survey of the records of the family court by such persons would
result in interesting findings as to the causes of marital problems.
At the same time, however, parties to proceedings in the family
court have a substantial interest in keeping their communications
to the counselors strictly "between you and me," regardless of how
detached and discreet third-party research workers may be. The
fact that the parties' communications are, to a degree, compelled
makes it especially important that they be treated with at least the
same degree of confidentiality that communications to lawyers,
physicians and religious advisers receive as a matter of fundamental
principle. If the records are to be made available to researchers, the
parties should be so informed before the initial interview, they
should be allowed to decide whether their files will be open or closed
to researchers, or all identifying references to the parties should be
deleted before the records are opened. Criminal liability should
attach to unauthorized use of the records, and they should be destroyed after one or two years.
A final objection relating to the Act's counseling provisions is
raised against proposed section 4720, which reads:
The court may in its discretion, and if the report of the counselor

so recommends, order either party to the marriage, or the minor children of the marriage, if any, to continue working with the professional

staff of the family court after the marriage has been dissolved. Any
person who fails to obey such an order may be found guilty of contempt of court.
61 Id.
62 See REPORT at 17-18.
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This provision, because it does not set any standards for the
determination of the conditions under which a party can be required
to work with the staff (under any conditions?), or specify what is
meant by "working with the professional staff" (undergoing psychoanalysis?), or indicate how often or for what length of time the court
can order a party to work with the staff (eight hours a day? for the
rest of his life?), or define what amounts to failure to obey such an
order (missing an appointment?), or provide for a hearing on the
order (can a 20-year-old child, who has not appeared in the proceeding, be ordered to work with the staff?), is unconstitutionally vague
and does not meet the minimal requirements of due process of law.
It is in derogation of individual liberties and is paternalistic to a
degree undesirable in state institutions. The provision should be
eliminated from the Act.
B.

The Standardfor Dissolution of Marriage

Under the Family Court Act, the counselor will make his report
within 120 days of the first interview.6" Within five days of the filing
of the report, the clerk will set the matter for hearing, 64 but there
is no provision for the time of the hearing. At the hearing, the judge,
upon the basis of the report and of any evidence presented by the
parties will, if he decides that "the legitimate objects of matrimony
have been destroyed and that there is no reasonable likelihood
that the marriage can be saved," order the marriage dissolved.6 5 If
he does not so decide, then he will continue the matter for not more
than ninety days. During the continuance the parties may undertake
counseling with the staff of the family court.66 If, at the end of 90
days (not at the end of the continuance?), one or both of the parties
decide that the marriage should be terminated, the court will order
it dissolved,67 or, if both parties request it, order their legal separation.6

The Family Court Act thus eliminates the "fault" grounds of
divorce. A majority of the Special Committee of the State Bar of
California "felt that the so-called 'no-fault' divorce system is preferable to the present system based upon legally prescribed
grounds." 6 9 The Committee's chairman and one other member, however, opposed the "no-fault" system and, while advocating the reten63
64
65
66
67
68
69

AcT § 4714.
Id.§ 4715.
Id. § 4716.
Id.§ 4717.
Id.§ 4718.
Id.§ 4719.
Brock Letter at 4-5.
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tion of the interlocutory decree, proposed that separation for a
period of years be added as a further ground for divorce. The reason given for their opposition is as follows:
Marriage is a contract which embodies rights and obligations and
parties entering that contract should not be told that it makes no
difference what they do or do not do toward the other spouse in
connection with that marriage. If we are to consider marriage as a
significant (if not sacred) contract, then it must embody some behavioral obligations. Under the proposed legislation it would make
no difference at all what efforts a party made to achieve a satisfying
relationship in a marriage he or she 70would escape from all responsibilities with minimal financial hazard.
Marriage is, of course, not a contract (it is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract 71 ), for if it were, it could presumably be
revoked by mutual consent, and, in any case, the law can prescribe
the manner of extinction of a contract.72

Although, from a legal point of view, the argument urged by
the dissenting committee members may be insubstantial, it has some
weight from a moral point of view. It confuses, however, the legal
and moral questions involved in the dissolution of marriage. As the
Governor's Commission points out:
Our study has convinced us that . . . a 'breakdown-of-marriage'
standard in no way derogates ecclesiastical doctrines of the indissolubility of marriage. When a Civil Court orders the dissolution of a
marriage, it does not reach the canonical bonds of the union; it acts
rather upon the complex of legal rights and duties that make up the
legal status of marriage. In point of fact, our present grounds for
divorce had their origin in ecclesiastical law, where they were grounds
for canonical separation only. They had nothing to do with civil
into the civil law and, in an ecclesidivorce until they were transferred
73
astical sense, misapplied.

The Family Court Act would thus restore the proper distinction
between the civil and moral law. It would permit the extinction of
the "personal relation arising out of civil contract," where the civil
foundations of that contract, the legitimate objects of matrimony,
have been destroyed. 74 It would not affect the obligations imposed
70 Id. at 9.
71 CAL. CIV. CODE

§

55

(West 1954).

72 Issue must be taken, too, with the dissenters' view as to "minimal financial

hazard," in the light of the Act's provision for equal distribution
erty (section 5100) and for alimony "in such amount and for
as the court may deem just and reasonable, having regard for the
respective parties including the duration of the marriage." Act
73 REPORT at 29-30 (footnotes omitted).
74 AcT § 4716.

of community propsuch period of time
circumstances of the
§ 5101.
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by the moral law, a matter properly left to the dictates of the parties'
individual consciences and other sources of spiritual guidance.
The separation of the legal and moral aspects of the dissolution
of marriage is not proposed for its own sake, but for the purpose of
tidying up the mess which has resulted from the attempt (currently
much less than half-hearted) to bring legal authority to bear in
upholding moral authority. It appears that the sanctity of the marriage relation is in no way obligated to, but is in fact mocked by,
the burlesque now being performed in our divorce courts. 75 As the
Group appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury stated:
We are far from being convinced that the present provisions of
the law witness to the sanctity of marriage, or uphold its public
repute, in any observable way, or that they are irreplaceable as buttresses of morality, either in the narrower field of matrimonial and
sexual relationships, or in the wider field which includes considerations
of truth, the sacredness of oaths and the integrity of professional
practice. As a piece of social mechanism the present system has not
only cut loose78 from its moral and judicial foundations: it is, quite
simply, inept.

The case for the abolition of the fault grounds for divorce has
been ably and more fully stated elsewhere, 7 and the present author
is content to record his endorsement.
C. Legal Representation
To a certain extent, the Family Court Act substitutes administrative for judicial procedures. This substitution is due, in part, to
the fact that "there has been widely circulated in recent months an
initiative proposal to remove family matters from the courts entirely,
and to place them in the hands of an administrative body .....7
A significant cause of dissatisfaction with existing procedures,
and a motive for the creation of a "bureau of divorce," is that the
present procedures are accessible only to persons who are able to
pay an attorney's fee. This fee, especially in the case of an uncontested divorce, may be disproportionate to the minimal services
rendered.
75 See REPORT at 30-31.
76 THE REPORT OF A GROUP APPOINTED BY THE ARCIBISHOP OF CANTERBURY,
PUTTING ASUNDER: A DIVORCE LAW FOR CONTEMPORARY SociTY 32 (1966).
77 E.g., REPORT at 26-32. Contra Goddard, The Proposal for Divorce Upon

Petition and Without Fault, 43 J. St. B. CALIP. 90 (1968).
78 Dinkelspiel & Gough, A Family Court Act for Contemporary California-A
Summary of the Report of the Governor's Commission on the Family, 42 J. ST. B.
CALIP. 363, 366 (1967).

SANTA CLARA LAWYER

[Vol. 9

The fact that persons without means are provided access to
the divorce court by legal aid societies in many localities, does not
mitigate the evil for persons who live in areas not serviced by such
societies or for persons whose income is slightly greater than the
standards of eligibility for legal aid. Also, insofar as legal aid attorneys are occupied by the formalities of the divorce procedure,
they are prevented from rendering other essential services to their
indigent clients. Thus, the evil of the present procedure is not eliminated but merely displaced.
The high cost of divorce may even be a cause of family breakup. In poor communities, estranged spouses enter into relationships
with third parties without obtaining a dissolution of their marriage.
When such relationships, not recognized by the law or by ecclesiastical authorities, become common, the institution of marriage loses
its "sanctity" in the eyes of the community, resulting in further
family break-up.
There is no compelling reason why attorneys could not be
eliminated from the procedure for the dissolution of marriage, at
the discretion of the parties, in cases in which the area of dispute
between the parties is minimal. In fact, for all that the Family
Court Act says, it should be possible under that law for the parties
to proceed without legal representation, where the issues are not
complex. It was perhaps for reasons of practical politics that the
authors of the Act did not make the dispensability of lawyers
explicit. A definite provision to that effect would be desirable and
would make the law more attractive to the proponents of a purely
administrative approach. The Act should also provide for a "petition
of inquiry" form, provided by the family court, which could be
utilized by persons with minimal education.
In fact, dispensing with lawyers in certain cases is essential to
the success of the new law, insofar as such success depends on the
cooperation of the parties. The "defendant" would be much more
inclined to participate in the reconciliation process if he did not
feel constrained to hire a lawyer in order to do so.
However, the possibility that unrepresented parties will be
admitted to the family court as a matter of course poses problems
for'lower income parties (wealthier parties would probably continue
to be represented). The first problem is that they will lack adequate
legal advice and assistance at points where their vital interests are
at stake. Thus, for example, a husband might, for the lack of legal
advice, fail to contest an award of child custody to which he is
entitled. The second problem is stated by the Committee of the State
Bar: "Nothing in the Act would require the counselors to be trained
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in legal or accounting or business matters and yet they would
presumably be in the position of resolving intricate economic problems where tax and other consequences might be of major concern. 79 Thus, for example, an unrepresented wife, having no one to
turn to for advice but the counselor, might be erroneously advised
to include her separate property in what purported to be a community property settlement.
The two problems of a lack of legal advice and of too much
legal advice from someone unqualified to give it, do not seem amenable to any ready solution. At the minimum a legal advisor should
be attached to the family court. At the maximum the court should be
empowered to order unrepresented parties, who can afford it, to obtain counsel and to appoint counsel for unrepresented parties who
cannot.
D. Child Custody
1. The "Parental Right" Standard. It is well established in
California that in a divorce action,
[w]here a parent applying for custody is in a position to take the
child and is not shown to be unfit, the court may not award custody
to strangers merely because it feels that they may be more fit or
that they may be
more able to provide financial, educational, social,
80
or other benefits.

In re Campbell"' is the leading case in California on the subject of the right of parents, as against strangers, to the custody of
minor children. The court in Campbell held that:
Under the general law . . . the father has a natural right to the care
and custody of his child . . . and this right is recognized by the provisions of our codes, [Cal. Civ. Code § 197, and what is now Cal.
Prob. Code § 1407] ....
[T]he right . . . is of essentially the same
nature as the right of property ....
The right must therefore be re-

garded as coming within the reason . . . of the constitutional provisions for the protection of property.
[U]nder the general law, the prima facie presumption is that the
parent is competent; and hence the court is not 8authorized
to appoint
2
another as guardian, unless it finds to the contrary.

The natural right theory of the Campbell court was followed
in Roche v. Roche. 3 There the court quoted the Supreme Court's
79 Brock Letter at 4.

80 Stewart v. Stewart, 41 Cal. 2d 447, 451, 260 P.2d 44, 47 (1953).
81 130 Cal. 380, 62 P. 613 (1900).
82

Id. at 382-83, 62 P. at 614-15 (emphasis added).

83 25 Cal. 2d 141, 152 P.2d 999 (1944).
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opinion in Princev. Massachusetts, 4 where it was said that "[i]t is
cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents,""5 and the following language of In re White: 6
The right of a parent to the care and custody of a child cannot be

taken away merely because the court may believe that some third
person can give the child better care and greater protection. One of
the natural rights, incident to parenthood, a right supported by law
and sound public policy, is the right to the care and custody of a
minor child, and this right can only be forfeited by a parent upon
proof that the parent is unfit to have such care and custody.8 7

The Campbell court's interpretation of section 197 of the Civil
Code and of what is now section 1407 of the Probate Code formed
the basis of the decisions in Newby v. Newby8 8 and Stewart v.
Stewart. 9 Thus, California has, through a long established line of
cases involving statutory interpretation, adopted the "parental
right" standard for child custody.
A third rationale for the "parental right" standard, in addition
to the natural right and statutory grounds, is suggested by Chief
Justice Traynor, then Justice, in his concurring opinion in Guardianship of SmithY0 His justification for that standard is that "the
rule requiring that custody be awarded to a [fit] parent in preference to a stranger does not operate to subordinate the interests of
the child to those of the parent,"'" because "it would seem inherent
in the very concept of a fit parent that such a parent would at least
be as responsive as the trial court, and very probably more so, to
the best interests of the child." 92 In other words, to award custody to
a parent found to be fit is, in all likelihood, in the child's best interest, for father (or mother), if fit, knows best-or at least better
than the court. A parent's claim of custody in obvious disregard of
the child's best interest would be evidence of his unfitness."
It should be pointed out that there is no explicit statutory
authority for the award of custody to a third party in a divorce
proceeding. Section 1407 of the Probate Code, however, impliedly
authorizes the appointment of a third party as a general guardian.
Section 138(1) of the Civil Code, which provides that, in a divorce
84 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
85 Id. at 166 (dictum).
86 54 Cal. App. 2d 637, 129 P.2d 706 (1942).
87 Id. at 640, 129 P.2d at 708.
88 55 Cal. App. 114, 202 P. 891 (1921).
89 41 Cal. 2d 447, 260 P.2d 44 (1953).
90 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 88 (1954).
91 Id. at 95, 265 P.2d at 891 (concurring opinion).
92 Id.
98 Id. at 97-98, 265 P.2d at 892.

1968]

DIVORCE REFORM

action, the court is to be guided in awarding custody "by what appears to be for the best interests of the child," may contemplate
an award to a third party, but that provision, when read together
with section 138(2), may be understood to apply only "as between
parents adversely claiming custody."
If Civil Code section 138 must be so read, then the only statutory basis for a "best interest," as opposed to a "parental right,"
standard is section 1406 of the Probate Code, which provides that,
in the appointment of a guardian for a minor child, the court is
to be guided by the best interests of the child. However, that
section must be read with section 1407, which establishes a parental
preference in the appointment of guardians. That preference, can,
according to the cases, be overcome only by a showing of unfitness
on the part of a parent, upon which showing the "best interest"
standard would come into play.
The rule that a parent may be denied custody if proved unfit
is non-statutory. The notion of unfitness, however, has not been
thoroughly developed in the decisions. As stated in O'Brien v.
O'Brien:9
The California courts have avoided the formulation of a clear-cut definition of "unfitness" applicable to all guardianship or custody cases,
and it has been stated that the variable and complex nature of human
relationships and conduct renders it impossible and undesirable to
do so. (Guardianship of Smith (1957) 147 Cal. App. 2d 686, 694 [306
P.2d 86].) However, in Guardianship of Willis (1954) 123 Cal. App.
2d 446, 450 [266 P.2d 944], the court quoted with apparent approval
the following definition of "unfitness" from the Massachusetts case
of Richards v. Forrest (1932) 278 Mass. 547 [180 N.E. 508, 510]:
'In general, the word means unsuitable, incompetent, or not adapted
for a particular use or service. As applied to the relation of rational
parents to their child, the word usually although not necessarily imports something of moral delinquency. Violence of temper, indifference
or vacillation of feeling toward the child, or inability or indisposition
to control unparental traits of character or conduct, might constitute
unfitness. So, also, incapacity to appreciate and perform the obligations
resting upon parents might render them unfit, apart from other moral
defects.' 5

As O'Brien itself illustrates, the quoted definition is not quite tight
enough.9
2. The Family Court Act's "Best Interest" Standard and -its
Potential Consequences. A provision of the Family Court Act is de94 259 A.C.A. 437, 66 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1968).

95 Id. at 442, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
90 See Guardianship of Smith, 147 Cal. App. 2d 686, 693-99, 306 P.2d 86, 92-95
(1957).
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signed to meet criticisms of the "parental right" doctrine97 by substituting a "strict best interest" rule. The Act provides as follows:
In any action where there is at issue the custody of a minor child,
the court may . ..at any time thereafter during the minority of the
child, make such order for the custody of such child as may seem
necessary or proper. In awarding the custody, the court is to be guided
by the following standards and considerations:
(1) Custody shall be awarded to either parent according to the
best interests of the child.
(2) Although preference in an award of custody shall be given
first to either parent, and second, to the person or persons in whose
home the child has been living in a stable and wholesome environment,
the court may award custody to persons other than the father or
mother or the de facto custodian if it finds that such award is required
to serve the best interests of the child. 98

It is not clear what is intended by the "preference" of subsection (2). It may be read to require that custody be awarded to a
parent (or de facto custodian) unless the parent (or custodian) is

shown to be unfit. But the "preference" may also be construed to
require an award to a parent (or custodian) only when the best interests of the child will be served thereby, or when no other person
or persons can better serve the interests of the child. When the
Comment by the Governor's Commission on the Family is considered, it becomes clear that the latter interpretation is the one

intended by the drafters of the Family Court Act. The Comment
states that:
[Proposed section 4900] changes existing decisional law to permit the
award of custody in proper cases to third persons without a specific
formal finding of complete parental unfitness.
It is the sense of the Commission that the paramount consideration must be the welfare of the child, but that the parents' primacy
of right to custody must be preserved. 99
The Governor's Commission, in its Report, elaborates upon its intentions in proposing section 4900:
[I]n the occasional case where the child's interests would be served
best by giving custody to a non-parent-a stepparent or relative, for
example-the court cannot presently achieve this without an affirma97 E.g., Roche v. Roche, 25 Cal. 2d 141, 144, 152 P.2d 999, 1000 (1944) (dissenting opinion); Guardianship of Casad, 106 Cal. App. 2d 134, 234 P.2d 647 (1951);

Shea v. Shea, 100 Cal. App. 2d 60, 223 P.2d 32 (1950) (dicta); 1 CALIFORNIA CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, THE CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAWYER § 15:22, at 562

(1961); Kay, Poverty and the Law of Child Custody, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 717, 719-20
(1966).
98 ACT § 4900.

99 REPORT at 100.
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tive finding that the parents are wholly unfit. This doctrine is designed
to secure the rights of the parents, which is surely a fit goal. Unfortunately, it sometimes loses sight, we believe, of the right of the child
to an award of custody which will promote the stability of his life
and best permit him to grow up as a happy and productive member
of society. 100
Note that proposed section 4900 does not require a showing

that it is not in the interest of a child that custody be awarded to
one of his parents; all that is required is a showing that it is in his
best interest that custody be awarded to a third party. Thus, a court
might find that a child would get along very well with a parent, but
if it further found that the child would be even better off with a
third party, then it would be permitted to award custody to the
latter.
The notorious Iowa Supreme Court decision in Painterv. Bannister'0 ' and the results on the trial level in two recent California
cases °2 illustrate the potential danger of the strict best interest
standard. In Painter,a father, upon the death of his wife and after
having failed to make satisfactory arrangements for the care of a
son, gave temporary custody of the boy to the latter's maternal
grandparents. The father remarried about a year and a half later,
and he and his new wife, who was "anxious to have [the boy] in her
home,"' °3 sought to regain the custody of his son, which the grandparents refused to relinquish. The father made a successful habeas
corpus petition in an Iowa court, but the execution of judgment was
stayed pending appeal. Some two and a half years after the child
was brought to his grandparents' home, when he was then seven
years of age, the matter was finally determined by the Iowa Supreme
Court.
The court said that "[w] e are not confronted with a situation
where one of the contesting parties is not a fit or proper person. ...
There is no suggestion in the record that [the father] is morally
unfit."' °4 The court found, however, that the father had grown up
in a foster home, that he did not do well in school, that he had
served in the navy and did not like it, that he had not held a steady
job and aspired to be a free-lance writer, photographer and painter,
that he had poor financial judgment, that he lived in the rear of an
old, unpainted, although tastefully decorated house, surrounded by
100 Id. at 39.
101 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
102 O'Brien v. O'Brien, 259 A.C.A. 437, 66 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1968); In re Raya,

255 A.C.A. 297, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1967).
103 Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 1395, 140 N.W.2d. 152, 155, cert. denied,
385 U.S. 949 (1966).
104 Id. at 1393, 140 N.W.2d at 154.
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weeds and wild oats, and had contemplated moving to Berkeley or
Sausalito, California, that he was an agnostic or atheist and was influenced by Zen Buddhism, that he was a political liberal and a
supporter of the American Civil Liberties Union, and that he had
behaved unconventionally at the funeral of his son's mother."°5
"[T]he kind of life [the boy] would be exposed to in the [father's]
household," according to the court, "would be unstable, unconven16
tional, arty, Bohemian, and probably intellectually stimulating.'
It appeared to the court that, upon the boy's arrival at his grandparents' home, he was maladjusted, unable to distinguish fact from
fiction, aggressive and undisciplined, and confused about his "fatherfigure."'0 7 These traits the court attributed not to the boy's five
years or to the death of his mother, but to the influence of his father.
On the other side, the court found that the grandparents were
college graduates, that the grandfather was an editor for the Iowa
State University Agricultural Extension Service, once a member of
the school board, and a regular Sunday school teacher, that they
had a large and comfortable house and that they were well-respected
in their community. 1°8 "[Their] home provides [the boy] with a
stable, dependable, conventional, middle-class, middlewest background. . . . It provides a solid foundation and secure atmosphere."' 9
The high Iowa court placed "a great deal of reliance" on the
testimony of an "eminent child psychologist," even though the trial
court had refused to "accept it at full face value because of exaggerated statements and the witness' attitude on the stand." 110 The
psychologist testified, on the basis of tests and "depth interviews,""' that the child had come to recognize his grandparents as
his parental figures,11 2 that to remove him from their home would
have the detrimental effect of destroying his "view of his own reality,"' 3 that "the chances are very high [he] will go wrong if he
is returned to his father,""' 4 and that the grandparents' advanced
age was unimportant, whereas it would be psychologically undesirable for the boy to live with persons of his own age range." 5
105

106
107

108
109

110
111

112

Id. at 1392, 1394-95, 140 N.W.2d at 154-55.
Id. at 1396, 140 N.W.2d at 156.
Id. at 1398-99, 140 N.W.2d at 156-57.
Id. at 1392, 140 N.W.2d at 154.
Id. at 1393, 140 N.W.2d at 154.
Id. at 1397, 140 N.W.2d at 156.
Id. at 1398, 140 N.W.2d at 157.
Id.
Id. at 1399, 140 N.W.2d at 157.

113
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1399-1400, 140 N.W.2d at 158.
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In reversing the order awarding custody to the father, the court
said: "We do not believe it is for [the boy's] best interest to take
him out of this stable atmosphere in the face of warnings of dire
consequences from an eminent child psychologist and send him to
'
an uncertain future in his father's home."116
7 is an
O'Brien v. O'Brien"1
upside down version of Painter.
Here the lower court, in a divorce action, found both parents of a
four year old girl unfit and awarded custody to her maternal grandparents, "whose home was a fit and proper environment for the
raising and training of the child and conducive to her best interests.""' The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision stating that the evidence indicated that the father, a dentist,

is by nature a reserved individual with a limited ability or inclination
for socializing with others or engaging in outward displays of affection;
that he devoted most of his energies to his business pursuits . . . and
did not spend a great deal of time with [the girl]; that on certain
isolated occasions, he had been less than a model parent, in that he
had left [the girl] alone briefly, had not immediately tended to her
dental needs and had twice engaged in heated arguments with [the
mother] in the child's presence. The record is devoid of any evidence
suggesting that plaintiff was in the least immoral or intemperate or
that he was ever intentionally cruel to his child. The only evidence
bearing upon [the girl's] feelings toward her father was to the effect
that she adored him."19

In In re Raya, 2 ° the lower court adjudged two children to be
dependent children within the meaning of section 600(a) of the
Welfare and Institutions Code and removed them from the custody
of their mother. According to the appellate court, which reversed the
trial court:
Section 600, subdivision (a) . . . permits an adjudication of
wardship when proper and effective parental care or control is lacking.
The phrase "proper and effective" offers at best a dim light to discern
the point at which a juvenile court is authorized to invade and supplant a parent-child relationship. In one sense the phrase expresses
an objective identical with the judicially expressed goal of the child's
121
welfare.

The facts were as follows:
[T]he couple, separated, were each presently cohabiting with
partners of the opposite sex under a consensual extramarital, but long
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id. at 1400, 140 N.W.2d at 158.
259 A.C.A. 437, 66 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1968).
Id. at 439, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 425.
Id. at 442-43, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
255 A.C.A.:297, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1967).
Id. at 302, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 255 (emphasis added).
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lasting, arrangement; ... [the mother] and her consort ...have had
while [the father] and his mistress .. .
four children out of wedlock
22
have had three children.'
[T]he children were happy, healthy and well adjusted in the
home provided by their mother and [her consort]; the mother and
[her consort] were satisfying the children's need for familial love,
security and physical well-being. The fact that the mother had established a home and was living with a man to whom she was not married
supplied the sole evidence which might support the finding. This piece
of evidence was inextricably coupled with a group of accompanying
circumstances: (1) the relationship was stable, not casual or promiscuous; (2) poverty alone had prevented [the mother's and father's]
divorce and the mother's marriage to [her consort] ....123

It is fair to say that, under the "strict best interest" formulation of proposed section 4900, results, such as those reached by the
Iowa Supreme Court in Painteror by the lower California courts in
O'Brien and Raya, would not be disturbed on appeal. In each of
the three cases, a judge, in the exercise of his sound discretion,
might have found that the interests or welfare of the children would
be best served by a third party. But it is plain, if one is permitted
to make a value judgment, that in none of the cases should the
parents have been denied custody of their children, for the reason,
apparent at least to the California appellate courts, that the parents
were not unfit.
It is suggested by one author, that the error which these cases
illustrate could be avoided if the family court were "assisted by a
staff of specialists, trained in social work, psychology, psychiatry
and sociology," '24 who would solve the difficult problem of determining what the best interests of the child require. The testimony
of the "eminent child psychologist" and the court's reliance on it
in Painter justify some skepticism in this regard.
Three further points, raised by the three cases above, should
be made here. One is that parents, during the period of separation,
illness, emotional distress, or financial difficulties which often precedes a dissolution of marriage, will consider placing their children
in the care of relatives or trusted friends. It would be unfortunate
if parents were deterred from taking this action for the benefit of
their children by a fear that, in the event they should find themselves in the family court, a judge will rule that the best interests

of the children require that they not be removed from the custody
122 Id. at 299, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 253.

123 Id. at 303, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
124 Kay, Poverty and the Law of Child Custody, 54 CAi.". L. REv. 717, 725
(1966).
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of the de facto custodian who, in many cases, will be better able
to provide a stable and secure environment.
A second point is that a standard as vague as the "best interests
of the child" will promote appeals and will thereby cause a prolongation of the child's uncertainty as to his relationship to his
parents or custodians-an uncertainty that in itself is against his
best interests. The more the litigation is prolonged, as in Painter,
the greater the shock to the child if and when he is eventually separated from his parents or custodians. Also, it will be difficult for
parents to vindicate their rights on appeal, for the longer a child
remains with a third party custodian, the greater will be the reluctance of a court to move the child.
Third, only in the rarest of cases will low-income parents be
represented by such "able and vigorous counsel,"' 2 5 and have the
assistance of such expert witnesses as are essential to the protection
of their and their children's interests when set against the findings
and recommendations of social workers, probation officers, and the
professional staff of the family court, who will not always have a
scrupulous regard for the personal rights of their "clients" or a high
level of tolerance for subcultural attitudes and practices. One would
not want to go so far as to say that the "best interest" standard is
aimed at the poor and at minority groups, but there can be no doubt
that it is they who would feel its sting.
In fairness to the Governor's Commission, it should be said
that its emphasis on the welfare of children is wholly praiseworthy.
Children should be protected from neglect, cruelty and exposure to
immorality. But it must be said that the "best interest" standard,
insofar as it is intended to protect children from harm, literally,
or almost so, "throws out the baby with the bath." There should
be a narrower means of protecting children from harm than a law
which authorizes the dissolution of the parent-child relationship
even when the parent is not harming the child.
As the Commission says, the "child's true interests" should not
be subordinated to "the parents' proprietary rights." 2 6 But the
suggestion that a parent's interest in his child is congruent with,
or even similar to, his interest in a chattel, is an instance of cynicism.
Chief Justice Traynor's observations with respect to the compatibility of the best interests of a child and the rights of a parent are
here very much in point.'
125

See In re Raya, 255 A.C.A. 297, 305, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252, 257 (1967).

126 REPORT at 38.
127 See note 90, supra, and

accompanying text.
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It should be said, too, that the Commission appears to be motivated by the laudable desire to spare parents the humiliation and
pain of being branded as unfit, and, as a consequence, of being forever separated from their children.' * The Commission's view, however, accentuates the negative and overlooks the fact that the
requirement that parents be proved unfit before they may be denied
custody is set up to protect, not to oppress, them. It is an exaggeration to say that a parent, once found unfit, cannot regain custody
of a child, for under existing law, as well as under the Commission's
own formulation, "the court may . . . at any time . . . during the
minority of any of the children of the marriage, make such order
for the custody as may seem necessary or proper ... .129 It is submitted that to make a showing of unfitness is neither as damning
nor as difficult a matter as the Commission implies."'
3. ConstitutionalObjections to the "Best Interest" Standard.
In In re Campbell,"' the court said that the right of a parent to
custody "must be regarded as coming within the reason, if not
within the strict letter, of the constitutional provisions for the protection of property." 132 This notion, which was not repeated in the
later cases, has no currency, and was of dubious validity in the
first place.11
The "parental right," however, if not protected by the fourteenth amendment restrictions on the taking of property, may come
under that amendment's guarantee against the deprivation of liberty
without due process of law. That liberty includes the right of the
individual "to marry, establish a home and bring up children,"'8 4
and the right of parents "to direct the upbringing and education of
children.' 13 The right to bear children is "one of the basic civil
rights of man."'186 There is a "private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter."'1 8 7 According to a concurring opinion in
Griswold v. Connecticut:18
128 See comment by the Co-Chairman and Executive Director of the Commission in Dinkespiel & Gough, The Case for a Family Court, I FAM. L.Q. 70, 80 (1967):
"[N]o useful purpose can be served by forcing a formalized finding of unfitness which
permanently cuts off parent from child."; REPORT at 39-40, 100.
129 CAL. CIv. CODE § 138 (West 1954); ACT § 4900.
130 See Guardianship of Shannon, 218 Cal. 490, 493, 23 P.2d 1020 (1933) ; O'Brien
v. O'Brien, 259 A.C.A. 437, 442, 66 Cal. Rptr. 424, 427 (1968); Guardianship of
Smith, 147 Cal. App. 2d 686, 693-99, 306 P.2d 86, 92-95 (1957).
131 130 Cal. 380, 62 P. 613 (1900).
132 Id. at 382, 62 P. at 614.
133 See Wadleigh v. Newhall, 136 F. 941, 947 (N.D. Cal. 1905).
184 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
135 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
186 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
137 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
138 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly
underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights . . . to
marry and raise a family are of a similar order and magnitude as the
fundamental rights specifically protected.
•.. The fact that no particular provision of the Constitution explicitly
forbids the State from disrupting the traditional relation of the family
-a relation as old and as fundamental as our entire civilizationsurely does not show that the Government was meant to have the
power to do so. Rather . . . there are fundamental personal rights
such as this one, which are protected from abridgment by the Government ....139
As to the question of whether the right of a fit parent to the
custody of his child is "so rooted in the traditions and consciences
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,"'" and "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,"'' two considerations are relevant,
if not determinative: the rule of the common law and the practices
of the several states. There can be no doubt that the "parental
right" standard was recognized in the common law, 4 2 and the practices of the states are summarized as follows:
In controversies between a father or mother ...and third persons,
as to the custody of children, while the welfare of the child is said
to be the prime consideration, the parent undoubtedly has a strong
prima facie right. No showing by a third person that he could furnish
the child a better home or education than the parent could furnish,
would cause a court to remove the child from the custody of its parents, if the home which they provided was decent and respectable
[citing cases]. The courts say that the natural affection of parents,
and the advantages of being brought up by one's own parents, outweigh
any possible advantage of wealth or culture, and thereby attempt to
keep the decisions consistent with the statement that the child's welfare is the main consideration. 143
With respect to apparent deviations from the "parental right"
standard in some states, it is said that:
Although one commentator purports to see 'a new current of concern
based upon a feeling that a child himself has a right to some minimum
level of care and opportunity . . . in contrast to an earlier total
concern with the right of the parent in his child,' the cases supporting
such an emphasis usually involve contests between parents or a nonId. it 495-96 (concurring opinion).
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
141 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
142 In re Campbell, 130 Cal. 380, 382, 62 P. 613, 614 (1900),
citing 2 KENT's,
'39
140

447 (Cooley ed.

COMMENTARIES *203; 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
143 J. MADDEN, PERSONS AND DoMESTIc RELATIONS

1899).
372 (1931); see cases cited

in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 4, Painter v. Bannister, 385 U.S. 949 (1966),
and in Brief for Board of Christian Social Concerns as Amicus Curiae at 4. (On file
in the University of Santa Clara Law Library.)
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he has stood in loco parentis . . . for an
parent who prevails because
144
appreciable period of time.

Another author points out that "most courts applying the best interest test to third party situations utilize a variey of procedural deincrease the probability of the natural parents winning
vices which
1 45
the suit."'

If there is a fourteenth amendment right on the part of a fit
parent to the custody of his child (except perhaps in the limiting
case where the child's "psychological best interest" requires that
custody remain in a long-term de facto custodian), that right "may
not be abridged by the state simply on a showing that a regulatory
statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper
state purpose."'

46

There is no question that the protection of the welfare of children is a "proper state purpose." There is some question, however,
as to whether the proposal that the court award the custody of children on the basis of their "best interests" has more than some rational relation to that purpose, because, as pointed out by Chief
Justice Traynor, a fit parent would probably be more responsive to
47
the best interests of the child than the trial court. It is arguable
that the proposed method of custody determination is not related
to the welfare of children with the requisite degree of rationality,
for the reason that the best interests of children are better known
to their fit parents than to judges, however buttressed the opinions
of the latter may be by those of psychological and sociological experts. As Chief Justice Traynor asks, "[i]s the trial court more
are, better
sensitive than the parent to what the child's best interests
4
qualified to determine how they are to be served?"'
The question of whether or not the Constitution of the United
States protects such natural or substantive rights as the right of fit
parents, against third parties, to the custody of their children, is
subject to a wide difference of judicial opinion. These opinions range
from the view that "the concept of liberty protects those personal
144

Foster & Freed, Child Custody, N.Y.U. L. REv. 423, 427 (1964) (footnote

omitted).

145 Comment, Alternatives to "Parental Right" in Child Custody Disputes Involving Third Parties, 73 YALE L.J. 151; 154 (1963).
(concurring opinion).
146 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 497 (1965)
from its natural
child
a
transfer
reasons,
gravest
the
but
any
for
can,
court
"No
parent to any other persons.. . ." People ex rel. Kropp v. Shepsky, 305 N.Y. 465, 469,
113 N.E.2d 801, 803 (1953).
147 Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 95, 265 P.2d 888, 891. (1954) (concurring opinion).
148 Id.
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rights that are fundamental" 49 to the belief that no "broad, unlimited power to hold laws unconstitutional because they offend
what this Court conceives to be the '[collective] conscience of our
people' is vested in this Court by . . .the Fourteenth Amendment,
or any other provision of the Constitution ....
"'5 The dominant

view seems to be that:
The doctrine that prevailed [in earlier cases]-that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the
legislature has acted unwisely-has long since been discarded. We
have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts
do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment
of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws. 151

However, even though the courts "do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need and propriety of laws that touch
economic problems ... or social conditions,' 5 ' they may make such
a determination with respect to laws which "operate directly on an
intimate family relation."'' And "there can be no doubt that at a
minimum [the words of the due process clause] require that depri-

vation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by
notice and opportunity for hearing appropriateto the nature of the
case"'1 54 nor that such requirements apply where "the result of the
judicial proceeding [is] permanently to deprive a legitimate parent
of all that parenthood implies."' 5 5 Viewed in this light, the words of
Chief Justice Traynor"5 ' take on a new significance. The Chief
Justice is perhaps saying that, in a contest between a fit parent
and a third party as to the custody of a child, there is no such thing
as a "hearing appropriate to the nature of the case," for "it would
seem inherent in the very concept of a fit parent that such a parent
would be at least as responsive as the trial court, and very probably
more so, to the best interests of the child."M 57
An argument can be made that since a fit parent is the best
judge of the best interests of his child, a court cannot, by way of
transferring the child's custody to a third party, substitute its judgment as to the child's best interest for that of the parent. For the
149 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (concurring opinion
of
Mr. Justice Goldberg).
150 Id. at 520 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black).
151 Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
152 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (emphasis added).
153 Id. (dictum).
154 Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306,
313 (1950)
(emphasis added).
155 Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 550 (1965).
156 Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 95, 265 P.2d 888, 891 (1954) (concurring opinion).
157 Id.
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court to do so would amount to a denial of the opportunity to be
heard in much the same way as would a court's arbitrary substitution of its finding of fact for that of a jury. It is in this sense that
the Chief Justice, in recasting "the concept of parental fitness in
terms of the best interests of the child ...

placed the rule upon its

5S8 -upon

the ground of procedural
best possible modern footing"'
adjudication of the paran
is
due
is
that
process
The
due process.
is unfavorable to the
determination
that
when
Only
ent's fitness.
When it is favorchild.
his
of
custody
the
denied
parent can he be
in whose custody
decide
can
he
only
that
able, due process requires
served.
be
would
the child's best interests
The author suggests that section 4900 (2) of the Family Court
Act be re-written as follows:
Custody shall be awarded to either parent, as against a non-parent,
according to the child's best interests, unless the court makes an
affirmative finding, based on clear and convincing proof, that the parents are unfit or otherwise incapable of exercising custody, or that to
remove the child from the de facto custody of a non-parent would
constitute a grave and immediate threat to the child's psychological
well-being; upon such a finding, custody may be awarded to a nonparent according to the best interests of the child.

4. Custodial Investigations and Reports. Section 4903 of the
Act provides that "whenever good cause appears, the court may
require an investigation and report concerning the care, welfare and
custody of the minor children of the parties" and that "the professional staff shall make investigations and reports thereof." Although

section 4903 makes provision for cross-examination of the persons
included
who prepare the custody report or who provide information
counthe
against
above
raised
criticisms
in it, it is still open to the
information,
unreliable
selor's report. Potentially prejudicial and
can
relating to intimate details of personal relations and behavior,
their
or
parties
the
of
objections
get before the court in spite of the
ability to show its unreliability.
The impact of misinformed and scandalous matter would of
are
course be felt hardest by persons who, because of their poverty,
15 9 Indeed, because of a deferunrepresented or underrepresented.
courts,
ence to the middle and upper classes on the part of some
of the
status
the
investigations would tend to be conducted into
4903
section
children of lower-class families. The report allowed by
child's
(but not the testimony of professionals with respect to the
Development,
158 tenBroek, California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin,
and Present Status, 16 STAN. L. REV. 900, 926 (1964).
159 Cf. In re Raya, 255 A.C.A. 297, 63 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1967).
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welfare) should be eliminated-at least where the parties are unrepresented.
5. Repeal of sections 199 and 214 of the Civil Code. The Act
would repeal Civil Code sections 199 and 214, relating to actions
to determine custody of children where there has been no divorce.
Those sections should be retained. It should be possible for a party,
who has religious scruples about divorce or who has hope for reconciliation after a period of months or years and who cannot obtain
the agreement of the other party as to a legal separation, to obtain
an "order or decree in regard to the support, care, custody, education, and control of the children of the marriage."' 60 If a person
cannot obtain legal custody of children other than by filing a "petition of inquiry," the consequences will be attempts at "self-help"
and an increase in the dissolution of marriages that might eventually
be saved.
E. Annulment
1. "The Coalescence of All Dissolution Proceedings." Under
present law, a marriage may be adjudged a nullity (annulled)
[U]nder certain circumstances ...

where a party to the marriage was

under the age of consent; where a former husband or wife of either
party was living and the marriage with such person was then in force;
where either party was of unsound mind; where the consent of either
party was obtained by fraud; where the consent of either party was
obtained by force; and where either party was, at the time of marriage,
physically incapable of entering into the marriage state and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable.' 6 '

"[C]onvinced that the essential question presented in the annulment of a voidable marriage does not differ from that presented in
any dissolution of marriage cases," the Governor's Commission, in
proposing the Family Court Act, recommended "the elimination of
the specific fault annulment grounds; the removal of the annulment
of voidable marriages as a separate form of action; and the coalescence of all dissolution proceedings (save for declarations of nullity
in case of void marriages) into a single form of action governed
by a single standard.' 1 62
2. The Standing of Parents and Bigamous Spouses. Where a
ground for annulment exists, the outcome, so far as the dissolution
of marriage is concerned, would be the same under the proposed
160 CAL. CIV. CODE § 199 (West 1954).
161 16 Cal. Jur. 2d Divorce, Separation, and Annulment § 320 (1967),
CAL. Civ. CODE § 82 (West Supp. 1968).
162 REPORT at 35-36.

citing
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law as under the present law. In either case the marriage will be
terminated if either party at the final stage of the proceedings so
decides. Where no ground for annulment exists, the outcome under
the proposed law might not be the same as under the present law,
because under the Act the marriage can be terminated upon the
decision of one of the parties, despite the lack of a ground. The outcome so far as the non-dissolution of the marriage is concerned may
not be the same where the following grounds for annulment exist:
that a party to the marriage is under the age of consent or already
married.
Under present law a cause of action for annulment will lie
under certain circumstances where a party6 3to a marriage was withSuch action may be
out the capacity of consenting thereto.
brought "by a parent, guardian, or other person having charge of
such married
such non-aged male or female, at any time before
64 The same is true
consent."'
legal
of
age
the
at
minor has arrived
15
under the proposed Family Court Act. "
Section 4723 of the proposed Act provides that, where the petition of inquiry is filed as provided in proposed section 4722, the
counseling services of the family court shall be available to the
parties, their parents or guardians, or to the person filing the petition. If the parties do not desire counseling, the court, upon proof
66
of the non-capacity to consent, shall dissolve the marriage.' If
the parties do desire counseling and decide to "become reconciled"
or, in any event, do not decide to "continue their application for
an inquiry into the marriage, with a view to its possible dissolution,"' 16 7 and if it is not the case that "the decision 8of one or both
6
parties is that the marriage should be terminated,"'

then, presum-

ably, the marriage will not be dissolved. The Act, in other words,
permits a minor, who does not have the capacity to consent to marriage but who somehow contracts a marriage not void ab initio, to
remain married despite the will of his parents to the contrary.
It is difficult to evaluate this outcome of the proposed law. On
the one hand, it would allow marriages to stand even though one
or both of the parties to the marriage may be under the age of
consent, where the relationship of the parties is strong enough to
emerge unscathed from the counseling gauntlet-which is perhaps
not undesirable. On the other hand, it would provide little protection
163 CAL. Civ. CODE § 82(1) (West Supp. 1967).
164 CAL. CIv. CODE § 83(1) (West 1954).
165 ACT § 4722.

166 Id.. § 4723.
167 Id. § 4704.
168 Id. § 4718.
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for strong-willed children or for children whose wills have been
overborne and who have contracted marriages against their best
interests. The law, too, would inadequately protect the interests of
parents in the care and custody of their children. It would encourage false swearing in the obtaining of marriage licenses.
Another thing to be said in favor of the effect of the new law
is that it would give protection to under-age persons who have married and are expecting or have borne a child. It would appear, however, that a better way of achieving that result would be to expand
section 79 of the Civil Code (proposed section 4413), which provides that "[w] hen unmarried persons, not minors, have been living
together as man and wife, they may, without a license, be married
by any clergyman," so that it applies to minors and so that the
anticipated or actual birth of a child constitutes "living together as
man and wife." To do so would have the further advantages of
discouraging false swearing and of securing such intimate matters
from the eyes of government.
Under present law an action for annulment will lie where, at
the time of marriage, "the former husband or wife of either party
was living, and the marriage with such former husband or wife was
then in force."' 169 In case the marriage in question is "knowingly
bigamous," as defined by implication in present section 61(2) of
the Civil Code and in proposed section 4602 (2), its absolute invalidity may be asserted or shown in any proceeding in which the
fact of marriage may be material. 7 ° Whether the marriage is knowingly or unknowingly bigamous, an action of annulment may be
brought, under present law, by the "former" husband or wife.171
However, the proposed Family Court Act does not give such standing to former spouses, where the marriage is unknowingly bigamous. 172 Even if the Act gave former spouses rights comparable to

those of parents under proposed section 4722, the result would be
similar to that described above. Thus, the putative spouse and the
bigamous spouse could remain married despite the will of the former
spouse to the contrary.
In the present case, however, the effect of the proposed law
is probably not undesirable. Where a husband or wife is reasonably
believed to be dead by his or her spouse, or has disappeared for
five years and is not known to be living, the spouse should be free
to remarry and raise a family without the threat that the former
CAL. CIV. CODE § 82(2) (West Supp. 1967).
170 16 Cal. Jur. 2d Divorce, Separation, and Annulment § 319 (1967).
-169

171 CAL. CIV. CODE § 83(2) (West 1954).
172 AcT § 4600.
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husband or wife will return and bring an action to annul the spouse's
remarriage. Even in the rare case in which the disappearing spouse
(e.g., a serviceman presumed dead or an amnesiac) is not the author of his or her own misfortune, it would seem to be more humane
to allow the remarrying spouse to determine for himself where his
responsibilities lie, rather than for the law to force him to abandon
his new family and to resume a perhaps defunct relationship. The
outcome in either case would probably be the same, for under the
present or proposed law, the spouse would seek the dissolution of
one marriage or the other, and remarry if necessary, as his feelings
dictated.
3. Declarationof Nullity. Section 4600 of the proposed Family Court Act carries over section 80 of the Civil Code and provides
for a declaration of nullity in the case of a marriage void from the
beginning. The void marriage is distinguished from a marriage that
is merely voidable under present law and which would be dissolvable in more or less the standard way under the new law.
Proposed sections 4601 and 4602 define two classes of void
marriages. There is perhaps a third class, consisting of marriages
which are "invalid because of failure to meet the essential require17 3
ments of licensing or solemnization."' Although this third class is
not defined by the present or the proposed law, it may be inferred
from sections 55, 68, 69, 69a, 70 and 71 of the Civil Code and from
sections 4300, 4400-02, 4405 and 4406 of the proposed Family
Court Act. The language of proposed sections 4604 and 4605
("[w]henever a determination is made under this chapter [having
to do with void marriages] that a marriage is void or otherwise invalid") 174 also implies a third category.
Proposed section 4601, which carries over section 59 of the
Civil Code, provides that marriages between parties of a certain
consanquinity are void from the beginning. Proposed section 4602,
which is based on section 61 of the Civil Code, provides as follows:
A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the life
a
of former husband or wife of such person, with any person other
than such former husband or wife, is illegal and void from the beginning, unless:
(1) The former marriage has been declared a nullity. In no case
can a marriage of either of the parties during the life of the other,
be valid in this state, if contracted prior to judgment decreeing the
dissolution of marriage.
173 REPORT

at 76.

174 ACT § 4604 (emphasis added).

1968]

DIVORCE REFORM

(2) Unless such former husband or wife is absent, and not
known to such person to be living for the space of five successive
years immediately preceding such subsequent marriage, or is generally
reputed or believed by such person to be dead at the time such subsequent marriage was contracted. In either of which cases the subsequent marriage is valid until its nullity is adjudged by a competent
tribunal.

Responsibility for the above quoted gobbledygook cannot be laid
on the Governor's Commission, for the Commission recommended
that section 61 of the Civil Code be carried over intact'15- although
to do so would presuppose an action for annulment and an incapacity
to re-marry for one year following the date of service or appearance
of the defendant in an immediately preceding divorce action.
The plain meaning of the first paragraph and the first sentence
of subsection (1) of proposed section 4602 is that no person may
validly re-marry during the life of a former spouse unless the former
marriage was absolutely void and has been judicially declared as
such. "Declared a nullity" means "declared void from the beginning," as proposed section 4600 itself makes clear. What is intended,
of course, is "annulled or dissolved" ("annulled" being necessary
to cover cases prior to the coalescence of all dissolution proceedings).
The second sentence of subsection (1) is unnecessary, ambiguous, and contrary to present law. It is unnecessary in that its intent
is carried by the preceding language of proposed section 4602. It is
ambiguous in that it is not clear which "parties" are referred to.
It is contrary to present law in that it would render absolutely invalid a marriage contracted prior to a decree of annulment, 7 ' or
prior to the entry of a judgment of divorce when the same might
have been entered if applied for 7 7 (since the proposed law would
repeal section 133 of the Civil Code which provides for the entry
of a final decree of divorce nunc pro tunc as of the date when such
decree should have been given), or under the conditions described
in subsection (2) where there has been no judgment decreeing the
annulment or dissolution of the marriage. 78
The second sentence of subsection (2) is inconsistent with the
coalescence of all dissolution proceedings. To adjudge a marriage
a nullity is to annul it, and the proposed law abolishes the action of
annulment. Further, with the abolition of the action of annulment,
175 REPORT at 74.
176 See In re Eichhoff, 101 Cal. 600, 605, 36 P. 11, 13 (1894) ; Biles v. Biles, 107

Cal. App. 2d 200, 202, 236 P.2d 621, 622 (1951).
177 'See Nicolai v. Nicolai, 96 Cal. App. 2d 951, 955, 216 P.2d 913, 916 (1950).
178 See CAL. C V. CODE § 61(2) (West Supp. 1967).
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every marriage not void from the beginning will be forever valid.
Marriages not void from the beginning, may not be invalidated,
although they may be dissolved. The sentence is also a redundancy
in that the foregoing language has already declared that such unknowingly bigamous marriages are not invalid. As a matter of fact,
it is not even a sentence.
The meaning of the proposed section 4602, including the intent
that subsection (2) should be an exception of subsection (1), would
be clearer if the first sentence of subsection (2) were merged
with the first sentence of subsection (1); if the second "unless"
[subsection (2)] were replaced by "or"; and if the last (purported)
sentence of subsection (2) were eliminated.
Proposed section 4608 ("[a] judgment of nullity of marriage
rendered is conclusive only as against the parties to the action and
those claiming under them") is superfluous in view of the abolition
of the judgment of nullity (annulment).
4. The Rights of Putative Spouses. The Governor's Commission, in proposing sections 4604 and 4605 of the Family Court Act,
recommended that innocent parties to a void marriage should be
entitled to a moiety of what would have been community or quasicommunity property and alimony had the marriage been valid. It
is not altogether certain that the recommendations of the Commission were not intended to apply also to marriages which are presently voidable. The uncertainty is introduced by the use, in proposed
sections 4604 and 4605, of the phrase: "whenever a determination
is made under this chapter that a marriage is void or otherwise
invalid." "This chapter" has to do only with void marriages, but it
is voidable marriages that are determined to be void. In place of the
word "determination," the word "declaration" should be used.
There is no need for a provision similar to proposed sections
4604 and 4605 with respect to parties to presently voidable marriages. A voidable marriage is valid so long as it is not annulled.
When it is annulled, it becomes invalid from the beginning. For
that reason parties to presently voidable marriages do not, upon
annulment, possess community property or a right to alimony. But
if the Family Court Act is adopted, abolishing the action for annulment, no presently voidable marriage could be annulled (although,
of course, such a marriage could be dissolved, and a void marriage
could still be declared a nullity). All presently voidable marriages
would thus be forever valid. Upon their dissolution they would be
treated the same as non-voidable marriages-that is, as formerly
existing, valid marriages. Parties to what are now voidable marriages would, therefore, be entitled to alimony, and the property
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acquired by their joint efforts will be community or quasi-community property.
The Governor's Commission's provisions for the case of a void
marriage present a problem which the following example may help
to clarify. Suppose that a husband deserts his lawfully wedded wife
and five children, and knowing her to be alive, marries another
woman. This second marriage is absolutely void. The first marriage
remains in force. Under section 164 of the Civil Code (section 5310
of the proposed Family Court Act), all the California real property
and all the personal property of the husband acquired while the
marriage is in force is community property. The first wife, under
section 161(a) of the Civil Code (proposed section 5305) has an
interest in said property which is present, existing and equal to the
interest of the husband. Suppose further that the second wife discovers the husband's bigamy and petitions for a declaration of nullity.
Under proposed sections 4604 and 5100, the second wife would
be entitled to half of the property acquired during her union with
the husband by their joint efforts, and, under proposed sections 4605
and 5101, she might be entitled to support payments from the husband. Thus, the proposed law intends to take from the husband and
give to the second wife the community property of the first wife
and to satisfy out of other such property such order of support as
cannot be satisfied out of the husband's separate property.
As the law stands, it would seem to authorize an unconstitutional taking of the property of the first Wife. This point of view,
however, does not appear to have been urged upon the California
courts, and it is well-settled by the cases that:
[W]hile, strictly speaking, there can be no community property in the
absence of a valid marriage, courts-will, in dividing gains made by
the joint efforts of a man and woman living together under a voidable marriage which is subsequently annulled [or a void marriage],
apply by analogy the rule which would obtain when a valid marriage
179
is dissolved.
And it is said that in the case of a contest between a legally recognized spouse and a putative spouse:
[T]he claim of a putative spouse must be limited to property acquired
during the continuance of that relationship. It seems obvious that
one-half of the property in question belongs to the putative spouse.
The other half belongs to the legal community (husband and legally
recognized spouse) and should be distributed as any other community
property under the same circumstances. 80
179 Schneider v. Schneider, 183 Cal. 335, 341, 191 P. 533, 535 (1920).
180

Estate of Ricci, 201 Cal. App. 2d 146, 149, 19 Cal. Rptr. 739, 740-41 (1962).
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Proposed section 4604 thus codifies existing case law, and proposed section 4605 is not inconsistent with the rationale of that law.
Taking it for granted that the provisions of those sections are wholly
desirable, the law relating to community property should be
amended accordingly.
To thus amend that law would solve a further community property problem which might otherwise arise under the Family Court
Act. If a putative husband or wife of a bigamous spouse obtains a
declaration of nullity or a dissolution of the marriage, he or she
will be entitled to half of the property of the union. The bigamous
spouse's original mate will be left with an undivided one-half interest
in the other half of such property. On the other hand, if the original
mate first obtains a dissolution of his or her marriage to the bigamous spouse, then, the putative husband or wife not being a party
to the dissolution proceedings, the original mate will be given onehalf of the property acquired while that marriage was in force, including one-half of the property acquired during the subsequent
union. The putative husband or wife, if he or she then obtains a
declaration of nullity or a dissolution of marriage, will be left with
one-half of the other half (a quarter) of the property of the subsequent union. It would seem that the way to avoid these anomalous
results would be to amend the law relating to community property
to the effect that only one-half of the property acquired by a putative and a bigamous spouse is the property of the community consisting of the legally recognized and bigamous spouse.
There is a final problem which may be dealt with here, although
it may more properly belong to a discussion of proposed sections
5100 and 5101, relating to the division of community property and
alimony. Under the Family Court Act, the knowingly bigamous
husband of the above example might obtain a dissolution of his
marriage to his first wife and would thereupon be entitled to an
equal division of the property acquired while they were living together. And if it was the wife who deserted the husband and who
bigamously remarried, then, upon the dissolution of her marriage
to her first spouse, she would be entitled to an equal division not
only of the property acquired while they were living together, but
also the property accumulated by the husband when they were no
longer living together 81 and (if she was justified by his misconduct
in deserting him) 182 earned by him.' 8 3 These possibilities should be
foreclosed by explicit statutes.
181 Sidebotham v. Robinson, 216 F.2d 816 (1954).
182 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 175 (West Supp. 1967) ; AcT § 5329.
183 O'Bryan v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1945); Commissioner v.
Cavanaugh, 125 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1942).
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F. Alimony and the Division of MaritalProperty
The special committee of the California State Bar, on the basis
of its study of the Family Court Act, reported that:
Section 5100 requires an equal division of community and quasi community property unless the court finds that 'the economic circumstances' of the parties requires an unequal division. The Committee
feels that this is too limiting. . . . The Committee is of the opinion
that the court, in its division of the community property of the parties,
should evaluate and weigh all circumstances of the situation including
the conduct of the parties during the marriage ....
[T]he court should
have great power to adjust the equities of the parties....
The law as it exists requires the court to award community property
in favor of the innocent spouse in cases of cruelty and adultery. There
is an even greater justification for an unequal division of community
property in cases of desertion, habitual intemperance, non-support
and conviction of a felony....
Section 5101 provides for alimony but appears in its wording to permit
alimony regardless of the conduct of the parties during the marriage.
The Committee is of the opinion that the conduct of the parties should
be considered, not on the matter of amount of alimony, but in con84
nection with whether alimony should or should not be given.'

There is much to be said on either side of the question of
whether property should be awarded and alimony granted on the
basis of fault. The State Bar Committee, however, ignores the determinative consideration that the elimination of the fault grounds
of divorce and the retention of the fault concept of property rights
are, analytically and practically, mutually exclusive. As the authors
of the Family Court Act say:
If our standard for the dissolution of marriage is to be an irreparable
breakdown of the marriage relationship rather than particular misconduct, it follows that fault should not be determinative of the
disposition of property, lest we let in by the back door what we have
sought to remove by the front.' 8 5
As in the case of divorce and division of property, we believe that
the elimination of the fault determinant in the awarding of alimony
186
will substantially lessen the bitter strife between the parties.
CONCLUSION
The Governor's Commission on the Family, in proposing the
Family Court Act, has rendered a valuable service to the people of
California.
184

Brock Letter at 7-8.
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at 45.

186 Id. at 48.
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This article disapproves the Act's too complete substitution of
inquisatorial for adversary proceedings, its switch from a natural
rights to a naive-utilitarian approach to child custody and certain
other of its provisions. It approves, however, the institution of the
family court and of reconciliation services (independent of the
court). It defends the abolition of the fault grounds for divorce
and for property distribution and alimony.
The enactment of the Commission's proposal, with appropriate
modifications, will place California in the vanguard of the Western
world's inevitable reform of its archaic and pernicious substantive
and procedural law of divorce.

